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ABSTRACT 
 
In the European rail industry, the market liberalization limited to the opening of the essential 
facilities (the train path) to new entrants is not enough to enable competition. For an efficient 
and effective entry, temporary access to quasi-essential complementary assets like rolling stock, 
mechanical maintenance workshops, data, schedules, etc. is also required. Like in all network 
industries, the deregulation process faces anticompetitive practices undertaken by the 
incumbents or may be thwarted by their market power. Several observed anticompetitive 
practices involve distorted access to these quasi-essential facilities. Therefore, competition 
agencies must deal with litigation between the incumbent and new entrants. Most cases have 
been settled, resulting in commitments from the incumbent. We argue that such transitory and 
case-by-case remedies fail to produce favorable conditions for a secure and efficient entry. 
Thus, we propose to systematize such remedies through asymmetric and enduring ex-ante 
regulation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The railway sector in the European Union is undergoing deep transformation and radical 
change. Starting in the 1990s, after a constant decline in railway’s share of the transport market, 
the EU proposed a novel organization of the sector to rely more on market mechanisms and 
enable competition between operators. The legislative framework for organizing the single 
market for rail services was completed in 2016, with the adoption of the 4th Railway Package. 
It contains provisions to foster the integration of European rail networks, improve infrastructure 
governance and fully liberalize commercial rail services to facilitate the emergence of new 
players. Finally, it regulates competition in the public services market. Nonetheless, railway 
liberalization so far appears slow to bear its promised fruits. This paper investigates the causes 
and shows what public authorities should do to foster competition on the merits.  
There are three avenues for introducing market forces in the rail industry. One approach is 
to separate or “unbundle” train operations from infrastructure so that independent train-
operating companies can compete with one another over the same tracks (Pittman, 2007). In 
other words, this option consists in a vertical separation between “below” and “above” the rail. 
This open access (OA) deregulation model—or on-track competition—implies that several 
network operators are allowed to compete for transport services. In this case, guaranteeing to 
new entrants “fair and undistorted access” to the network is a necessary condition, though we 
will show it is not sufficient to ensure successful liberalization. The European Union has mainly 
chosen the OA deregulation model for commercial passenger services and freight services, and 
the model is fully implemented in countries such as the UK, Sweden, Netherlands or Germany.  
The OA model was partially inspired by the telecommunications4 and energy industries in 
the 1980s where potentially competitive activities—such as long distance or mobile 
telephony—were separated from less competitive ones (i.e., local hard-wire services). It was 
also inspired by air transportation where airlines have long competed while using airport 
facilities provided by separate entities (Gómez-Ibáñez and de Rus, 2006). 
The second approach is to organize competition for the market. In this case, operators 
compete for the provision of a given service, for a specified period of time using, at least 
partially, the existing assets and workforce. This model is well known in public transport and 
has been implemented in passenger rail services mostly for non-commercial services that are 
                                                        
4 See, for example, the work of Laffont and Tirole (1999) in the telecommunications sector. For an analysis of 
an optimal access regulation with downstream competition, see, e.g., Kao et al. (2014). 
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not economically viable without subsidies. There are exceptions to this case, such as in Spain 
where the independent infrastructure manager (ADIF) organises competitive tendering for the 
supply of high-speed services on its network. Three packages are allocated, with different 
frequencies on the three main high-speed routes. The contracts last for 10 years and the ADIF 
allocates capacity on its infrastructure and access to its stations.5 
The last approach is to privatize railway companies in the hope that competition among 
investors for their ownership or control will put pressure on managers to be more efficient. This 
is the horizontal separation scheme. It is the competition by systems in which several vertically 
integrated networks compete (Pittman, 2017). They share the assets and the rights of the former 
monopoly.  
From a theoretical perspective there is no consensus in the economic literature on the optimal 
structure for liberalizing railways (see, e.g., Besanko and Cui, 2016, 2017, 2019). The trade-off 
between vertical integration and separation is not clearly determined. Besanko and Cui (2016, 
2017) show for instance that horizontal separation has a strong tendency to produce a higher 
network quality, while unbundling has a strong tendency to result in lower transport prices and 
higher consumer surplus. From an empirical point of view, Cantos et al. (2012) review the rail 
reforms of 23 European countries. They estimate the determinants of inefficiency and confront 
different methodologies to test their robustness. The authors find that the best system 
corresponds to complete vertical separation with measures that introduce competition (in and 
for the market) in the passenger and freight rail markets. 
In this paper, we focus on unbundling, or the competition in the market produced when track 
management is sufficiently separated from the running of trains (OA). Europe has chosen this 
system, but it seems that the ongoing reforms have taken time to deliver their benefits. Two 
issues are therefore raised. First, is providing access to the tracks enough to remove barriers to 
entry for new competitors? Experience shows that the level of competition several years after 
the liberalization appears to be unsatisfactory (Henry, 2019). At the same time, competition 
authorities are dealing with numerous cases based on article 102, relating to margin squeeze, 
strategic downgrading of the service quality provided to new entrants, capacity withholding, 
and delays in communicating information necessary to access the network. These cases have 
mainly been settled through negotiated procedures but as these commitments are intrinsically 
                                                        
5 This is not an OA regulation like in Italy, Austria, or the Czech Republic (see infra). Spain has undertaken 
an original deregulation model. See “The Spanish high speed officially liberalized,” 
https://mediarail.wordpress.com/2019/04/24/the-spanish-high-speed-officially-liberalized 
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transitory and market-player specific, they fail to ensure undistorted competition in the market 
and they do not guarantee a level playing field between incumbents and new entrants in the 
long run. 
Second, these practices and their remedies are systematically related to quasi-essential 
assets. In other words, the denial of access is not usually related to the tracks (the natural 
monopoly narrowly defined) but to the very specific complementary assets necessary to 
compete with the incumbent. If the incumbent controls such assets, its competitors must acquire 
them to operate. These assets can be analyzed as a barrier to entry. A barrier to entry may be 
defined as a sunk cost that new entrants must bear, and that the incumbent did not previously 
have to pay. This is exactly the case here since these assets have been funded under an exclusive 
right regime. Acquiring these assets requires significant upfront investment and may delay or 
deter entry. These assets can act as quasi-essential facilities since external financers consider 
that they induce a prohibitive cost for a new entrant, which operates on a limited scale compared 
to the incumbent. In other words, mandating that all incumbents in the EU provide compulsory 
access to some of these assets may partially correct the apparent market failure. Therefore, an 
ex-ante regulatory intervention may be the most appropriate way to address these difficulties. 
Additional regulatory mechanisms are needed to make the market effectively contestable 
and competition sustainable. The scope of these mechanisms should be precisely identified, 
including the assets held by the incumbent that would be accessible by new entrants on 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. Our approach stresses the complementarity between 
the European directives (e.g., the 4th Railway Package), competition-law enforcement, and an 
asymmetric sector-specific regulation to achieve an effective liberalization process. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the liberalization process 
of European railways. Section 3 identifies the main obstacles to effective competition by 
stressing the importance of barriers to entry and the effects of incumbents’ anticompetitive 
strategies. Section 4 aims to demonstrate that competition-law-based remedies may be 
insufficient to guarantee the effectiveness of the liberalization process. Section 5 identifies the 
scope of regulation and the tools needed to ensure the effectiveness of sustainable competition 
in this field. Section 6 concludes and suggests avenues for future research. 
 
2. LIBERALIZATION OF EUROPEAN RAILWAYS 
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First, we describe the very progressive legal process of liberalization. Second, we assess EU 
Member States’ experiences of the market opening, which demonstrate the difficulties 
encountered in promoting effective competition in the sector. 
 
A/ Key steps in the European railway deregulation 
 
The EU railway liberalization process consists of four Railway Packages adopted over the 
last two decades.6 The 1st Railway Package, adopted in 2003, focused on the governance of the 
rail sector. The text established the principle of vertical separation between infrastructure and 
operations. Accordingly, infrastructure managers were required to have separate accounts and 
to operate independently of service companies. There was no obligation, however, to have a 
legal or patrimonial separation between infrastructure and operations and, in many countries, 
the incumbent remained in charge of both, often organized within different business units. This 
first package established the principle of open, transparent and non-discriminatory access to 
infrastructure. A system of licenses for train-operating companies was organized and 
companies were required to have the appropriate license to operate trains on given lines. 
Finally, the international freight market was opened to competition. 
The 2nd Railway Package, adopted in 2004, opened the domestic freight market from 2007. 
Although certain pioneers, such as the UK (1994), Germany (1994) and Sweden (1996), had 
already opened their national freight markets, most European countries did so between 2004 
and 2007. In 2010, the 3rd Railway Package opened international passenger transport to 
competition. It included cabotage, i.e., the possibility for international carriers to offer domestic 
services as part of an international route.  
Finally, the 4th Railway Package, adopted in 2016, provides for full liberalization of national 
passenger transport by 2020 (see, e.g., Gutiérrez-Hita and Ruiz-Rua, 2019).7  To promote 
competition, the 4th Railway Package strengthens the principle of OA and reinforces the 
                                                        
6 For a historical survey of the EU liberalization and preconditions for competition on the tracks, see Knieps 
(2003). 
7 Directive (EU) 2016/2370 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 amending 
Directive 2012/34/EU as regards the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and 
the governance of the railway infrastructure, OJ L 352, 23.12.2016, p. 1-17. 
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independence of infrastructure managers.8 The purpose of these requirements is to prevent 
conflicts of interest within companies that remain vertically integrated. 
Full liberalization is so far restricted to commercial lines. For public services, there is no on-
track competition. However, from 2023 onwards, public services will also be outsourced and 
operated under contracts awarded following a competitive tendering process. By exception to 
this rule, direct award may be possible under certain conditions. Finally, we note that on-track 
competition may be restricted to protect the public service segments and avoid cherry-picking 
strategies by entrants. 
 
B/ Country experiences in opening European railway markets 
 
The liberalization of passenger rail services within the EU has been much slower than that of 
freight services, which was largely completed by 2007. The main difference between these 
markets is that freight transport is handled on a case-by-case basis while passenger transport is 
a regular service. Beyond this difference, the liberalization model is the same. This section 
presents the main European experiences of market opening both in freight and passenger 
markets.  
 
Freight services markets 
Freight transport in the EU has been losing market share for years (from 12.51% in 2000 to 
11.24% in 20169) and it is well below the EU’s goal to reach 30% by 2030. In contrast, rail 
freight has significant market share in large countries like the US (30%), Canada, Russia (80%) 
and India (30%).10 Geographic differences may explain that gap. Rail freight has a natural 
advantage in large countries, where distances are long, so rail has a competitive edge over road. 
In Europe distances are short, giving road an advantage, and conditions vary between countries: 
                                                        
8 For instance, para. 10 of the directive states that “decision-making by infrastructure managers with respect 
to train path allocation and decision-making with respect to infrastructure charging are essential functions that 
are vital for ensuring equitable and non-discriminatory access to rail infrastructure. Stringent safeguards should 
be put in place to avoid any undue influence being brought to bear on decisions taken by the infrastructure 
manager relating to such functions.” 
9 Based on tonne-kilometers, including inland modes only. See the European Commission’s 2018 Statistical 
Pocketbook, available at https://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-fundings/statistics/pocketbook-2018_en 
10 Russia and the Central and Eastern European countries introduced competition among freight train operators 
through the OA provision to the monopoly infrastructure (Pittman et al., 2007). 
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railway infrastructure is managed at a national level, with different standards and widely-
varying access charges (being imposed).11 
Nonetheless, Laroche et al. (2017) report that competition on the European rail freight 
market has been active between companies. They use indicators for the rail freight market such 
as persistence of profit and the ratio of capital cost to labor cost. These indicators show positive 
signs of increasing competition and attractiveness in the market despite the non-significant 
impact of liberalization at the European level. In 2017, the share of domestic incumbents—
based on net tonne-kilometers—continued to decrease compared to 2015 but remains 
predominant. Both foreign incumbents and non-incumbents have experienced a slight increase 
in market share, 1.9 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively (IRG-Rail, 2019). 
Operators have developed differentiation strategies and business models based on new 
services such as leasing and outsourced maintenance or drivers. These allow sunk costs to be 
reduced, increasing the attractiveness of market entry. Thus, the authors show a strong increase 
in the number of newcomers after the 2nd Railway Package.12 They argue that “there is a market 
for rail freight in which it is possible to do business despite intra-modal competition, road 
competition and the imperfect European single market.” (Laroche et al., 2017, p.60). 
Several major obstacles remain, though (see infra). First, there are still barriers in the market 
which increase the costs for entrants. For instance in Germany, Slack and Vogt (2007) 
documented that infrastructure was tailored to the needs of passenger traffic and the dominant 
Deutsche Bahn Group. Second, the persistence of profit analysis revealed imperfect 
competition in the market caused by imperfections in the single market itself (barriers and 
segmented market). 
Marzano et al. (2018) list a series of obstacles in the rail freight sector, including persistent 
infrastructural gaps, delays and compromises in applying the EU Railway Packages, conditions 
of unfair competition with respect to rival modes, and difficulties in providing door-to-door 
instead of terminal-to-terminal railway services. Based on the Italian case, the authors designed 
an equitable incentive calculated on an origin-destination pair basis. In practice, they computed 
a discount to the access charge the rail operator is required to pay to the rail network 
                                                        
11 See, David Briginshaw, “Time is not on the side of European rail freight operators”, International Railway 
Journal, Aug 1, 2018. https://www.railjournal.com/opinion/time-is-not-on-the-side-of-european-rail-freight-
operators 
12 Cowie (2015) reports the British experience for which there were actually few entrants. The privatization 
has not been followed by the expected rise in rail freight carriage or in the provision of intermodal services. 
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infrastructure manager. The calculation also differs by type of train, to account for their 
different infrastructural needs, and can be adjusted on a yearly basis to account for ongoing 
network improvements. 
To sum up, rail freight has been facing doubly-imperfect competition (Crozet, 2017). On 
one hand, the intermodal competition between road and rail is unbalanced. On the other hand, 
intramodal competition between railway operators is still imperfect.  
 
Passenger services markets 
In 2017, domestic incumbents were still the largest market players in passenger rail services, 
with a market share of 76%, measured in passenger-kilometers. These services include public 
services. Foreign incumbents capture 8.4% of the market and new entrants 15.6% (IRG-Rail, 
2019). There is currently competition on the market for passenger services (OA competition) 
in Germany, Sweden, Italy, Austria, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Other countries 
are in the process of implementing it. For instance, in France, train paths can be booked since 
January 2019 and trains will operate on the high-speed network from December 2020. 
Experience of on-track competition remains quite limited. Across Europe, Perennes (2017) 
identified 34 open-access competitors in the passenger sector in 7 countries13 and she reports 
that more than a half of the services were closed after a few months. Her study does not include 
joint services offered by several incumbents between their countries, like Thalys or Eurostar. 
She distinguishes four categories of competitors: new companies offering high-quality services 
on the most important routes (3); new companies on licensed segments that extend their service 
to OA segments in connection with their franchised network (8); low-cost companies (12), and 
niche operators (11). Very few services are competing directly with the incumbent on the 
commercial segments of the markets. And, among the three high-end services, only one is a 
pure entrant, the others are subsidiaries of a foreign incumbent operator (see Figure 1 in the 
Appendix regarding the number of railway operators by country over the period 2016-2017).14  
These figures are therefore rather deceptive and competition in the market remains limited 
in the passenger services market. Indeed, in Germany, no competitor managed to capture 
                                                        
13 Austria, Germany, Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. 
14 According to the IRG-Rail report, rail operators should be differentiated between new entrants (pure players 
who are not subsidiaries of any incumbent operators), the incumbent(s) of the observed market, and foreign 
incumbents who are new entrants to the observed market but incumbents in their home market, for instance, SNCF 
in the German market. To provide an illustration, in 2016, market shares of the French freight market were the 
following: 17% pure players, 18% foreign incumbents, and 65% SNCF. 
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significant market share in OA segments. Uncertainty seems to be a major obstacle to entry; 
Perennes (2017) mentions capital risk as the main obstacle to entry and documents that most of 
the entrants used refurbished rolling stock to minimize that risk. It is therefore not a surprise to 
observe that high-end competitors are few on the market. In France, Cherbonnier et al. (2017) 
show, using simulations, that the outcome of market opening remains highly uncertain and 
depends crucially on whether or not the incumbent distorts prices and how much access to the 
train paths the entrant obtains. Ivaldi and Pouyet (2018) provide a methodology to estimate the 
parameters of the railway systems that are relevant to the evaluation of various policy reforms. 
They show that the incumbent French rail operator has not been fully and properly regulated 
and argue that policy reforms should be designed to account for the incentives given to the 
incumbent. 
In Poland, Interregio, a challenger of the state-owned PKP Intercity developed a large-scale 
supply of services and managed to capture a substantial fraction of the market (approximately 
one third) before it had to exit in 2015. Exit was caused by an alteration in the challenger’s 
business strategy combined with an unfavorable change in the market environment and the 
incumbent’s use of political action to put its competitor at a disadvantage (Król et al, 2018). 
Despite the lack of entry, there are some successful experiences where competition clearly 
benefits consumers, who are charged lower prices and receive higher quality services. Italy is 
probably the most successful story with two high-speed train companies competing on the 
tracks. Beria et al (2016) observed an average 15% price decrease for the Milan-Ancona service. 
More broadly, Beria et al. (2019) found that prices are not the only drivers of intramodal 
competition for rail; demand, capacity, users’ willingness to pay, and distance also play an 
important role. Furthermore, Bergantino et al. (2015) report a positive impact of entry on the 
supply of high-speed train services and a negative impact on the price of airfares on comparable 
routes.15 In Italy, as soon as it entered high-speed train services, the new entrant sought to 
innovate in terms of the quality of on-board train services (free Wi-Fi, multimedia services, 
high-end catering). In the end, both the new entrant and the incumbent operator have developed 
complementary buses, car rental, and car-sharing services. Both companies have also expanded 
their train station services (ARAFER, 2016). 
Similarly, in Sweden, Vigren (2017) reports a 13% price decrease for the Goteborg-
Stockholm service after the entry of a competitor. Other studies find an increase in the quality 
of services following entry. For instance, Tomeš et al. (2014) show an improvement in both 
                                                        
15 Further evidence of intermodal competition can be found in Cascetta and Coppola (2014). 
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frequency and services on the Prague-Ostrava line. Using a consumer survey, Tomeš et al. 
(2019) conclude the same for the Prague-Brno line: OA competition increased the quality of 
services, especially for the incumbent’s trains. 
 
3. MAIN OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE COMPETITION  
 
The examples above show that successful competition on the tracks benefits consumers. 
Entry remains limited, however, and in this section we examine the main obstacles to the 
development of effective competition. 
There are indeed, important barriers to entry. These barriers can be structural (asset 
specificity) or linked to the incumbent’s foreclosure strategies (e.g., anticompetitive practices). 
And, even where there is entry, some operators may be forced to exit because they may not be 
able to compete on the merits. 
 
A/ Structural barriers to entry: lack of entry and reasons for exit 
 
The ownership unbundling was not requested by European directives. For instance, the 
Deutsche Bahn has never been vertically-separated. Furthermore, the French SNCF had 
abandoned its managerial unbundling to converge towards the German system. Even in the case 
of a functional unbundling as European directives recommend, the main problem identified 
across the EU is the following: transparent and non-discriminatory access to the train paths is 
not enough to remove all the structural barriers to entry. There are several barriers beyond 
access to the tracks that possibly hinder a new entrant from challenging the market. We identify 
at least four structural barriers to entry. 
 
(i) Network and asset specificities and access to rolling stock  
For passenger services, rolling stock is not available through leasing, as is the case for example 
in air transportation, and there is no second-hand market for rolling stock. Furthermore, the 
assets used abroad cannot be easily redeployed in other countries because of their technical 
specificities (Crozet, 2017).16  
                                                        
16 For instance, rolling stock can be specific to a subset of a given network. Yvrande-Billon and Ménard (2005) 
stress that before the liberalization, the British railway system was decentralized with a segmented regional 
organization. Consequently, the rolling stock was very heterogeneous and so vehicles and locomotives were not 
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For an entrant, the provision of in-house traction services is not necessarily possible in the 
short term or even in the long term, because the investment can be too costly and not easily 
redeployable (e.g., Riordan and Williamson, 1985). The delivery times of the ordered material 
can be long, leading to a certain supply rigidity. Therefore, even if a strong challenger decides 
to enter the market, it will face potentially huge sunk costs in case of failure. To amortize the 
investment, the scope of entry must immediately be significant. A final difficulty lies in the 
training and certification of train drivers. Incoming entrants may have difficulty finding 
qualified labor. 
To avoid these constraints, it is necessary to develop an approach that incorporates 
redeployability of specific assets. To overcome the high capital cost and facilitate entry, entrants 
should have access to high quality rolling stock. This can be done through mandatory sharing 
procedures put in place by regulators. Such procedures would give access to rolling stock at a 
substantially lower capital cost and facilitate asset redeployability. 
In addition, the specificity of the energy supply constitutes a barrier to entry if manipulated 
by the incumbent to increase rivals’ costs. For instance, the case related to Deutsche Bahn 
illustrates how an incumbent can engage in margin squeeze strategies against new entrants by 
artificially increasing their energy costs.17 In this case the new entrants were obliged to use the 
electricity sold by subsidiaries of Deutsche Bahn because no other provider could supply 
electricity at the specific frequency of 16.7 Hertz used to power the locomotives on the network.  
In the same vein, the incumbent company on the Slovak market was fined for abuse of 
dominance after it refused to lease specific locomotives to new entrants or to refuel their 
locomotives in its specific and indispensable infrastructure.18  
 
(ii) Maintenance and commercial services access 
Entrants need access not only to the tracks, but also to maintenance and repair centers.19 The 
investments necessary for the construction of maintenance facilities and the characteristics of 
                                                        
interchangeable. The monopoly structure artificially maintained highly specific assets that generated important 
rigidities and impaired entries at the beginning of the liberalization process. 
17 European Commission, decision No. 39678 Deutsche Bahn I, 18 December 2013. 
18  Antimonopoly office of the Slovak Republic, decision Cargo, 5 December 2014 
https://www.antimon.gov.sk/council-of-the-antimonopoly-office-upheld-the-10-million-fine-for-cargo  
19  For instance, the French railway regulator recommended in a May 2019 opinion to request from the 
incumbent to provide to the new entrants an access to its maintenance centres in transparent and not discriminatory 
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such facilities, held by the incumbent transport operator, are likely to give the latter a clear 
advantage over its rivals. The difficulty of accessing maintenance centers is a major barrier to 
entry for new players. The French rail regulatory authority, ARAFER (2018) reviewed practices 
in several countries and noted that regulation of technical and pricing conditions for access to 
existing maintenance facilities and services made it easier for new operators to enter the market. 
It recommended that a significant range of services in maintenance facilities be regulated. 
Similarly, to increase transparency, it is important to have an inventory of existing maintenance 
facilities, the content of the services they provide, the capacities available in these facilities, 
and the price at which they can be accessed. 
A recent ARAFER decision against SNCF illustrates that access to maintenance-related 
infrastructure and services is essential for containing the costs of new entrants and guaranteeing 
the quality of the service provided.20 French regulations require that the incumbent operator 
provide access that meets all the needs of entrants at a price that covers the cost of the service 
plus a reasonable remuneration. The regulator found that the incumbent failed to comply with 
these requirements, and showed deficiencies both in pricing and access. 
 
(iii) Difficulties in accessing data 
Market access for entrants may be also impeded in two ways: limited access to schedules and 
online booking services and an imperfect access to information related to slots, availability, and 
customer data. The solution is to remove the information rent enjoyed by the incumbent by 
giving the incumbent operator to give new operators access to its customer database, in 
compliance with privacy legislation. Competition impediment through distorted access to data 
can take place both in the case of competition in the market and for the market. For instance, 
the Dutch competition authority fined the incumbent in the Netherlands for providing 
incomplete and delayed responses to rivals’ requests for access to information necessary for a 
bid, which disadvantaged the new entrants.21In the same vein, ARAFER underlines that the 
incumbent might voluntarily underinvest in its own information system to reduce its quality to 
                                                        
conditions (para. 70). See ARAFER, avis n°2019-028 du 9 mai 2019 sur le projet d’ordonnance relative à la 
nouvelle SNCF. 
20 ARAFER, Decision n° 2019-O25 of 18 April 2019. 
21 Dutch Competition Authority, n° 16.0691.31, Nederlandse Spoorwegen, 22 May 2017. 
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impair the capacity of its potential competitors to provide good quality services and thus to raise 
barriers to entry.22  
 
(iv) The incumbent’s reputation 
The incumbent’s reputation among consumers could be a barrier to entry for new operators. 
Customers may face (psychological) switching costs, as surveys on the Cologne-Brussels and 
Cologne-Amsterdam lines demonstrate (Paha et al., 2013). Thus, to avoid this imbalance 
between the new operators and the incumbent operator, ARAFER (2018) recommends that the 
various activities of the public rail group be clearly distinguished from the incumbent operator, 
in terms of brand and logo.23 
  
B/ Behavioral barriers to entry 
 
Several cases show that the quasi-essential nature of some complementary facilities can be the 
basis of exclusionary strategies by incumbents. The effects of such strategies are similar to 
refusal of access and act as a barrier to permanent and efficient entry. Relative denial of access 
may be distinguished from absolute refusal in the sense that access is allowed but under 
degraded conditions that encourage exit. Some strategies make entry costlier or even 
impossible, while other practices degrade the effectiveness of the entrant’s business model once 
it has entered. 
The exclusionary risk stemming from the incumbent’s strategic behavior is significant 
considering the asymmetries between actors. The incumbent can also implement an 
anticompetitive behavior to foreclose the market. Importantly, these anticompetitive practices 
are not limited to access to the infrastructure. 
In this context, one may wonder whether OA and infrastructure separation are enough, even 
though the 4th Railway Package strengthens the conditions of non-discrimination and the 
absence of conflicts of interests. However, it does not seem to ensure sustainable market 
contestability, or at least noncooperative oligopoly interaction. Along with the entry barriers 
                                                        
22 See para. 52, ARAFER, avis n°2019-028 du 9 mai 2019 sur le projet d’ordonnance relative à la nouvelle 
SNCF. 
23 The same concern was expressed by the French energy regulator, the Commission de régulation de l’énergie 
(CRE), which mandated the incumbent to change the name and the logo of the electricity transmission and 
distribution system operators in accordance with the code of good conduct. 
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related to access to (almost essential) assets, we should consider the anticompetitive practices 
implemented by the dominant operator. We provide three examples of anticompetitive practices 
simply to illustrate how market contestability may go unheeded.  
 
(i) The Lithuanian case (2017) 
This first case provides an example of how a new entrant’s access to infrastructure may be 
impeded. It illustrates an incredibly blatant strategy undertaken by an incumbent. Here the 
denial of access to competitors took the form of the strategic dismantling of a rail infrastructure. 
The EU Commission imposed a fine of 28 million euros on the Lithuanian incumbent operator, 
Lietuvos Geležinkeliai, for hindering competition in the rail freight market. “The European 
Union needs an efficient rail freight market. It is unacceptable and unprecedented for a 
company to dismantle public rail infrastructure to protect itself from competition,24” Margrethe 
Vestager, the EU competition commissioner, stated. Despite its rather extreme nature, this case 
illustrates possible ways of denying access to an essential infrastructure. Access may be refused 
if the infrastructure holder provides evidence that access is objectively impossible, however 
that impossibility must not, of course, result from its own behavior. A refusal of access can be 
considered abusive if the asset holder has not made the necessary investments to be able to 
respond to requests for access,25 or if it has not taken internal reorganization measures to free 
capacity (see the Frankfurt airport case cited below). Another way of denying access to essential 
facilities is to delay acceptance of an access request and propose other timetables than those 
required, as for instance in the GVG case settled by the EC in 2003.26 
 
(ii) The SNCF freight case (2012) 
The following case exemplifies an exclusionary abuse at the expense of the new entrant, Euro 
Cargo Rail (a DB subsidiary). 27 The practice must be placed in the context of the prevailing 
organization of the French network at the time. Despite a formal vertical disintegration, the 
train operator (SNCF) remained the delegated infrastructure manager on behalf of the track 
                                                        
24 Margrethe Vestager, European Commission, 2 October 2017. 
25 For a comparable statement of objections in the energy industry, see the ENI case. European Commission, 
Decision COMP/39.315 – ENI, 29 September 2010. 
26 European Commission, Decision 2004/33/EC, 27 August 2003, case COMP/37.685 GVG/FS. 
27 French Competition Authority, decision No. 12-D-25 of 18 December 2012 on practices implemented in the 
rail freight transport sector. 
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owner (RFF).28 In the same vein, specific and costly assets such as freight-dedicated wagons29 
and locomotives were pooled to facilitate new entries by lowering access and exit barriers, 
however, these assets were also managed by the incumbent. The incumbent operator thus had 
an informational advantage over new entrants: it could anticipate their commercial strategy (via 
requests for access to the rails to establish estimates); it knew the reliability levels for each 
piece of equipment in the pools; finally, it had complete information on the location of the 
loading and unloading areas. The incumbent’s very particular position facilitated the 
implementation of foreclosure strategies.  
The incumbent employed three foreclosure strategies. The first was to exploit its 
informational advantage (leaks on train path bookings, leaks on technical visits necessary for 
entrants, etc.) that allowed targeted predation of entrants. The second was to overbook tracks 
and wagons (despite additional costs and penalties). A substantial fraction (20%) of the reserved 
tracks were unused and the incumbent operator systematically reserved single-track sections to 
make access by its competitors impossible. Similarly, specific freight wagons were overbooked 
and were therefore unavailable to new entrants. Overbooking is not anticompetitive in itself, 
but it can raise competition-related concerns when it goes beyond what is necessary to cover 
the railway’s operating risks. Paying for an unnecessary booking does not make economic 
sense, except in terms of hindering competition. The incumbent willingly loses money with no 
prospect of compensation except increasing its future market power by creating an artificial 
bottleneck that limits the capacity of new entrants to access the market. Such an overbooking 
can be analyzed as predatory behavior. The third strategy was to use its knowledge of the 
equipment in the pools to make the least reliable locomotives available to competitors. This 
made it possible both to increase rivals’ costs and to degrade the quality of service they provided 
to users. SNCF reserved the modernized locomotives for its own use only. One can draw a 
                                                        
28 One may observe vertical reintegration through the new French law related to railways. See loi n° 2018-515 
du 27 juin 2018 pour un nouveau pacte ferroviaire. 
29 For instance, one of the anticompetitive practices at stake in the French freight case concerned the “EX”-
type wagons, which are specifically used for large-tonnage transportation. As the competition authority states, “in 
2006, when the railway freight sector opened up to competition, the only rental company providing such wagons 
in France was SGW (a subsidiary of the SNCF group), to whom all other EX-wagon owners and holders had 
entrusted their fleet's rental management”. However, the SNCF kept the exclusive use of the whole EX-wagon 
fleet and did not make them available to new entrants. The competition authority stated that “during the first two 
years after the market opened up to competition, EX wagons represented an essential resource in the short term 
that would have enabled SNCF's competitors to enter and develop in the market”. 
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parallel with the Slovak case quoted above in which the incumbent obliged the new entrant to 
use diesel locomotives and not the more efficient electric ones, and in addition refused to refuel 
these locomotives in its own facilities.30 
 
(iii) The voyages.sncf.com case (2009) 
A third type of practice, still based on a distorted access to a quasi-essential facility, involves 
behaviors aimed at consolidating the incumbent’s dominant position in the passenger transport 
services market and at extending it to downstream markets (e.g., online booking). Such 
behaviors correspond to anticompetitive leverage strategies. The Voyages.sncf.com case 31 
provides an interesting example of such practices.  
The incumbent, SNCF, had concluded an agreement with Expedia to commercialize on-line 
tickets. This joint venture enjoyed privileged conditions of access to a database for reservations, 
ResaRail.32. Competitors were required to purchase a license to use a computer interface, Ravel, 
in order to access the database. This led to both tariff and technical discriminations. The first 
was financial. SNCF and Expedia benefited from direct and free access to ResaRail. Traditional 
travel agencies accessed it through an intermediary (Global Distribution Systems), which 
charged a binomial tariff: 20 € per month fixed cost plus 0.004 € per ticket issued. The situation 
was significantly worse for online agencies: the price for acquiring the Ravel license ranged 
from 1,500 to 54,000 € and each ticket issued cost €1.10. The financial conditions of access 
induced significant distortions in the downstream market of online railway ticket 
commercialization, consolidated the relative advantage of the incumbent, and targeted its most 
dangerous competitors. The practice also induced technical discriminations. The service 
provided by new entrants could not be as valuable as that of the incumbent because the system 
initially did not allow them to issue electronic tickets or to display (less costly) iDTGV offers 
on the first page of search results.33 
 
                                                        
30 Antimonopoly office of the Slovak Republic, decision Cargo, 5 December 2014. 
31 French Competition Authority, decision n°09-D-06 of 5 February 2009, related to practices implemented by 
EDF and Expedia Inc. in the online distribution of train tickets. 
32 The RésaRail database contains information on timetables, available seats, and ticket prices of SNCF rail 
passenger transport services. 
33 This competition-law-based case was also settled through a negotiated procedure. The theoretical advantage 
of such a settlement is to immediately ensure a level playing field. However, SNCF competitors have stated it was 
too late to save competition. 
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4. CURRENT LAW DOES NOT ALLOW FOR EFFECTIVE COMPETITION 
 
We have seen that the need for access for new entrants goes beyond the tracks. Complementary 
quasi-essential assets are required for efficient entry into the railway market. In this section, we 
will see that several previous competition-law-based decisions by the European Commission 
and national competition authorities have settled cases relating to access and have imposed 
access where necessary. However, the complementary assets were never qualified from a legal 
point of view as “essential facilities”,34 and the remedies were obtained through commitment 
procedures. In other words, these commitments are only negotiated on a case-by-case basis 
without any mandatory effects on other incumbents and are intrinsically transitory. Therefore, 
they do not produce a real case law and do not address the structural difficulties of the railway 
liberalization. 
In this section, we present the scope of such remedies and ask whether a sector-specific 
regulator could be the best body to provide a general framework for an effective and sustainable 
competition on the market. Clearly, for an effective market liberalization, barriers to entry 
should be removed. This can be done by providing access to other facilities besides train paths. 
A competing railway undertaking would need the following services to operate on the market: 
access to train tracks, traction services (locomotives and drivers), terminal services, commercial 
and technical spaces, and schedules and booking services. Access to train paths is guaranteed 
by the Directive but this is not the case for access to other segments. 
 
A/ Effective access requires more than access to the tracks  
 
Relying on competition-law-based remedies is possible as case law demonstrates. However, it 
remains notably insufficient. Commitments are negotiated on a case-by-case basis. They 
involve only one relevant market and one market player, and they cannot produce structural 
effects on the whole EU internal market. As it appears that the 4th Railway Package does not 
address this issue, a more systemic approach must be implemented. 
                                                        
34 According to the essential facilities doctrine (EFD), while a dominant operator controls an asset that its 
competitors cannot bypass and if this asset is indispensable to access the market because of its natural monopoly 
situation or because of the unreasonableness of its replication in financial or in technical terms, the essential 
facilities owner may be bound to provide new entrants an access in fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. 
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Providing complementary institutional arrangements seems relevant to ensure an effective, 
practicable, and sustainable competition in the field. The structural barriers and the strategic 
behaviors used against new entrants demonstrate that an OA to the network is not enough to 
achieve this competition. In EU case law, competition remedies, particularly through negotiated 
procedures (commitment decisions), have often been used to supplement liberalization 
directives or to counterbalance incumbents’ market power (see, e.g., de Hauteclocque et al., 
2011). However, competitive tools alone may not be enough. They are implemented on a case-
by-case basis and they do not make it possible to impose EU-wide uniform and long-term 
remedies, as we demonstrate in our next subsection.  
 
B/ Competition-law-based remedies are insufficient 
 
For access to these complementary services, competition authorities can hardly rely on the 
essential facilities doctrine (EFD) as these assets are unlikely to fit the definition of an essential 
facility. The dominant operator is particularly responsible for preserving an effective 
competitive process, even though it may mean that asymmetrical duties will be imposed on it, 
as illustrated by the case law produced in other network industries. An incumbent may be bound 
by competition-law-based remedies that require access to be given to assets exceeding the strict 
scope of the essential facilities.  
To illustrate the scope of these remedies, we can draw parallels with other utilities, such as 
airports. The Frankfurt/Main AG case (Commission, January 1998),35 for example, dealt with 
physical barriers to entry. The available spaces for ground handling services were all used by 
the incumbents. New entrants were only given the option of remote, costly, and inefficient 
locations a long distance away from the planes. On the surface, the refusal of access appears 
reasonable; a dominant undertaking should not have to increase its costs or to impair its internal 
efficiency to favor its competitors. However, the Frankfurt airport manager was obliged by the 
Commission to reorganize its own services to make room for incoming competitors. Similar 
remedies were also imposed to ensure equal access to terminals and to commercial and 
technical areas. The purpose was to ensure a level playing field and to limit the incumbency-
                                                        
35 European Commission, Decision of 14 January 1998 relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EC 
Treaty (IV/34.801 FAG - Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG). 
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related advantage.36 In the same way, competition agencies can impose an undistorted access 
to the tracks. In the GVG case, for instance, the Italian incumbent’s commitments provided 
access, as discussed below. 
Furthermore, access to the complete supply chain and not only to the essential assets must 
be guaranteed to ensure effective entry into the rail industry. A profitable entry is difficult to 
achieve in a limited number of market segments. From an economic point of view, one should 
consider the entry and exit barriers that define the critical size necessary for a profitable entry. 
Lowering these barriers may require extending the scope of mandatory access to not obviously 
essential assets. Indeed, the entry of new competitors is only possible through OA to several 
(almost) essential asset types. However, the directive only focuses on access to the train tracks. 
This issue is common to several network industries. It is nevertheless a particularly acute 
problem for railways because of the multiplicity of assets for which access is needed (energy, 
rolling stock, data, etc.) and the multiplicity of actors at stake (essential facilities managers, 
competitors, etc.). As discussed in Section 3, for an entrant, the provision of in-house traction 
services is not necessarily possible in the short term (or in the long term in fact). Access (at 
least temporarily) to the incumbent’s traction services may be a way to overcome these 
obstacles, as the GVG EC Decision (2003) demonstrates.37 Again, a competition-law remedy 
was used to address this issue but only in a specific case. 
What was the situation at stake for GVG? The Commission obtained a negotiated remedy 
that extended essential facilities beyond the natural monopoly. “By refusing to provide Georg 
Verkehrsorganisation GmbH with traction comprising a locomotive, a qualified driver familiar 
with the route and the technical support necessary for the purposes of the abovementioned 
service, Ferrovie dello Stato SpA abused its dominant position on the traction market and 
thereby prevented GVG from entering the international rail passenger transport market, in 
breach of Article 82 of the EC Treaty”. In this case, settled through a commitment procedure 
in August 2003, the Commission accepted the proposals of the Italian incumbent to provide 
access to this new entrant to its network (from Domodossola to Milan), to constitute an 
international grouping to enable GVG to provide international services and traction services. 
                                                        
36 As the EU Commission stated in its decision: “FAG’s decision not to open up the market for the provision 
of ramp-handling services is not justified by the consideration that it is the airport operator and as such is entitled 
to determine how to organise the activities that take place within the airport area. The airport must exercise its 
organisational rights in accordance with the rules on competition” (§98). 
37 European Commission, Decision 2004/33/EC, 27 August 2003, case COMP/37.685 GVG/FS. 
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In addition, two decisions by the French competition authority with respect to the gas and 
electricity sectors show that access to incumbents’ consumer data might be required to ensure 
a level playing field.38 Data might be at the heart of an incumbent’s competitive advantage. It 
can anticipate which consumers will potentially be attracted by specific offers or are likely to 
respond favorably to new entrants’ marketing. The incumbent can micro-target its marketing 
investments and limit the potential market of its competitor. Mandating incumbents to share 
their data may mitigate such risks.  
In February 2019, the Spanish competition authority (CNMC) approved a resolution 
allowing railway operators to access stations and other facilities, such as workshops and service 
centres, owned by the Spanish infrastructure manager ADIF.39 The decision included a series 
of measures to favour the entry of new operators, particularly in view of the complete opening 
of the sector by December 2020. The CNMC also set a maximum deadline of one month for 
operators of service facilities to answer requests made by railway companies or other 
candidates, thus allowing them to know the true capacity of these services. The regulation and 
resolution issued by the CNMC compels the companies that operate this type of facility 
(passenger stations, freight terminals, workshops) to publish a document detailing the 
installation that includes basic information on the conditions for access. 
Competition-law-based remedies address the specific concerns about competition in the 
cases in question but fail to provide a general framework that guarantees access to these quasi-
essential facility assets. As competition agencies cannot qualify these complementary assets as 
essential facilities because of the legal requirement imposed on this qualification, they can only 
use negotiated procedures in a regulatory way. This can be a satisfactory transitory solution (as 
commitments are only made for a limited of period of time) but cannot be the method for 
imposing an EU-wide regulatory approach that provides permanent access to these facilities 
and accepts an asymmetric regulation of competition. 
 
5. EFFECTIVE COMPETITION NEEDS MORE THAN ACCESS TO THE RAIL 
 
                                                        
38 French Competition Authority, decision n°13-D-20, 17 December 2013, related to practices implemented by 
EDF in the sector of services related to photovoltaic generation, and decision n°17-D-06, 21 March 2017 related 
to practices implemented by Engie in the supply of gas, electricity, and energy-related services. 
39 “Spain: Rail liberalization moving forward with CNMC resolution,” Competition Policy International (CPI), 
February 5, 2019. 
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If competition-law-based remedies are to address some of the issues discussed above, such as 
data sharing and asset mutualization, it would appear that these remedies must be imposed on 
a wider scale. However, competition law is not enough to guarantee a level playing field and 
effective competition in the market. What is required is not only a strong sectorial regulation 
but also the implementation of regulatory devices accepting an asymmetric logic. 
A sector-specific regulation is needed if it appears that, at the very beginning of the 
liberalization process, competitors cannot be viable in financial and strategic terms. Two 
situations may be observed. The first is the inability of competitors to be as efficient as the 
incumbent (because of its larger scale and scope). The second involves the structural 
disadvantages discussed above, which call for asymmetric regulations. Similar regulations have 
been implemented in the telecommunications sector and can be reproduced in the rail sector. 
Several approaches can be considered. The first one consists in giving access to not-
obviously essential assets controlled by the incumbent, with the aim of lowering both entry and 
exit barriers. The ladder of investment approach is one example (Odale and Padilla. 2004). 
Another approach can be compulsory sharing of strategic assets (data, facilities, etc.) and can 
include asymmetric duties imposed on the incumbent. 
 
A/ Competition-law enforcement should be completed by a strong sector-specific 
regulation 
 
Strong remedies such as those related to data can be imposed on incumbents. Some examples 
from the telecommunications and energy sectors show the regulatory remedies needed to 
promote effective competition in the rail sector. For instance, the French competition authority 
mandated EDF (2013) and ENGIE (2017) to share with their competitors their databases of 
customers eligible for regulated sales tariffs. Similarly, in the telecommunications sector, the 
French competition authority intervened when incoming users’ access to essential information 
was blocked (e.g., a list of subscribers eligible for ADSL). In the case of railways, the sector 
regulator should be responsible for defining and monitoring these corrective measures. The 
higher the complexity of the economics of the liberalized sector, the stronger the need for 
sector-specific regulation. 
However, this regulation should not be limited to guaranteeing a level playing field, as 
asymmetric remedies may be needed to achieve an effective liberalization. Twenty years ago, 
in the broadcasting industry, Deakin and Pratten (1999) described the continuous need for 
regulatory interventions to maintain effective competition on markets that are not the product 
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of spontaneous orders but are the voluntary and conscious product of organisational rules 
resulting from a sectoral liberalization. 
 
B/ Asymmetric regulation is needed 
 
Beyond competition-law measures, one must assess what kind of regulatory asymmetric 
measures are needed to compensate the imbalance between the incumbent and new entrants. A 
complementary and potentially asymmetric sector regulation must be designed. The examples 
of other network industries may be useful, in particular the liberalization of the 
telecommunications sector.40 
This sector was characterized by several asymmetries. Some of them were related to costs, 
such as mobile call termination tariffs, which were differentiated according to the market share, 
irrespective of the actual cost, in order to correct for the higher financial costs borne by new 
entrants compared to the incumbent. Other asymmetric measures were related to asset access. 
The most typical – and controversial – approach was the ladder of investment approach. This 
guaranteed to new entrants a temporary access to assets beyond essential ones. It promoted 
entries by reducing risks on new entrants’ investments. It limited free-riding risks and, through 
its transitory nature, preserved the incumbent operators’ incentives to invest.41 
In the telecommunications sector, this model imposed facilities sharing beyond the scope of 
the natural monopoly in order to facilitate competition for services as a first stage of the 
liberalization process (Cave, 2006). According to this approach, infrastructure-based 
competition is only possible at a second stage, when the market share of the new entrants is 
sufficiently developed to make the funding of their investments possible. Entering the market 
through the services segment may help the new competitors “to invest in experience before 
investing in their own physical infrastructures" (Bourreau and al., 2010). There are two main 
advantages to this progressive entry. The first is an investment in reputation. As consumer 
awareness of the services provided by the new entrant increases, the consumers’ willingness to 
pay increases thereby reducing the associated demand risk, which may make it easier for the 
                                                        
40 For instance, these concerns were addressed in the telecommunications sector through the implementation 
of the ladder of investment approach and through MVNO-type solutions for a given span of underlying services. 
41 Activating GVG-type remedies may lead to subsidising inefficient competitors. A competition-law-based 
logic, putting the emphasis on consumer welfare, may limit such remedies to a “representative” efficient 
competitor on the market (that has already reached “the minimum efficient scale to enter the relevant market”) 
that cannot finance such assets (Castaldo and Nicita, 2007). 
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new entrant to invest in the future in its own facilities. The second advantage is to reduce the 
risk premium imposed by financers, who may be reluctant to support a costly entry in such a 
market.42 
The underlying idea is the following: a new entrant cannot reasonably invest immediately in 
all the assets necessary to compete efficiently against the incumbent. Investing in specific assets 
is necessary to be as efficient as the incumbent but is not financially viable considering the 
potential sunk costs,43 the incumbents’ advantages related to economies of scale and scope,44 
its reputation, and its informational knowledge (customer data), and the fact that a new entry 
commonly starts on very specific routes.  
Thus, the ladder of investment approach aims at enhancing market contestability by lowering 
both barriers to entry and barriers to exit through asymmetric regulatory-type remedies. It is not 
a matter of guaranteeing a level playing field but of reducing the costs and the risks associated 
with entry for new competitors. 
However, this regulatory remedy has potential negative side-effects. If access prices are too 
low and if the access is seen as permanent by the market players, investing in its own 
infrastructures may represent a significant opportunity cost for new entrants (Bourreau and al., 
2010). A new entrant may be deterred from investing in its own capacities as it involves a cost 
without any immediate benefit (see the replacement effect as described by Vogelsang (2007)).  
The ladder of investment approach aims to preserve incentives to invest through a micro-
management of the regulation. If the stepping stone to favour initial entries remains the service-
                                                        
42  Lenders may be particularly risk averse considering the difficulty of recouping these very specific 
investments in a limited market segment. In addition, a lender, considering the specificity of traction-related assets, 
may anticipate that the only possible buyer in case of exit would be the incumbent. 
43 The entrant may have to overcapitalize in order to achieve the same level of reliability as the incumbent 
enjoys, due to its level of redundancy. The relative cost of the reliability is higher for the new entrant because it 
cannot mutualize its investment over a large number of routes. One possible solution is to pool some of the 
incumbent’s assets under third-party management or supervision. See para. 75 of the ARAFER opinion, n°2019-
028 du 9 mai 2019 sur le projet d’ordonnance relative à la nouvelle SNCF. The opinion recommends to create a 
specific subsidiary in charge of the management of maintenance centers as the Spanish Renfe and the German 
Deutsche Bahn had already implemented. 
44 This type of asymmetric treatment may be compared with the criteria used for exclusionary prices. It echoes 
the difference between the as efficient competitor test and the reasonably as efficient competitor one. Considering 
that a new competitor cannot be immediately as efficient as the incumbent, the competition authority must check 
not only if a given price strategy may lead to the exclusion of a competitor, actually as efficient as the incumbent, 
but also a competitor who might be hypothetically as efficient if it were to operate in a similar range of activities. 
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based competition approach, full access to the incumbent facilities should be time-limited. If 
the entry assistance provided by the regulator is extensive, it must remain transitory. This 
regulatory remedy is implemented in a ramp-up manner. Consequently, the access charge has 
to be progressively increased or the access has to stop after a given period of time in order to 
incentivize new entrants to climb up the ladder. To neutralise the risks related to the 
replacement effect described above, the new competitors must know that the regulator will burn 
up the rung on which the entrant is currently standing. The process should continue until access 
is limited to the natural monopoly segment. 
Following Bourreau et al. (2010), three issues need to be considered in terms of regulatory 
management. The first issue is related to information. How to manage the necessary regulatory 
fine-tuning since information is both incomplete and asymmetric. The second issue is related 
to the regulator’s credibility. How to guarantee that the regulator does not renege on its 
commitment to progressively remove the rungs of the ladder, if its decision might lead to a 
market exit (Odale and Padilla, 2004). The last issue is related to late entries. If some rungs are 
already removed, should the regulator put them back for a late comer? 
  
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
To conclude, it appears that the liberalization requires the implementation of far-reaching 
competition-law-based remedies and that simply ensuring access to necessary facilities (within 
the meaning of the 1998 Bronner judgment45) is not enough. Guaranteeing an effectively level 
playing field implies removing barriers to entry and exit. As market players remain significantly 
dissymmetric and as the incumbent might easily impair the new entrants’ access to the market, 
it appears necessary to accept “competition imperfections” to avoid “liberalization failures” 
(see Gaffard and Quéré (2006) for an equivalent trade-off in the field of competition-law 
enforcement). In other words, guaranteeing an effective and sustainable competition implies a 
free but distorted competition with, for example, an asymmetric regulation of competition. In 
order to be practicable and sustainable under these specific circumstances, competition should 
be imperfect. One has to accept (or even to generate through regulatory interventions) 
imperfections to make the competitive process effective. 
                                                        
45  EU Court of Justice, case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner Gmbh & Co. KG / Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverlag Gmbh & Co. KG e.a, 26 November 1998. 
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Such asymmetric regulation has already been implemented in former liberalization 
experiences, such as the telecommunications sector.46 It involves a broad and transitional access 
to other quasi-essential assets (rolling stock, commercial and technical premises, data) and even 
asymmetric treatments aimed at counterbalancing incumbents’ market strengths (for instance 
in terms of economies of scale and scope). However, such an asymmetric treatment should not 
last an indefinite time, considering its side-effects in terms of incentives. It should be limited to 
a transitory period, as for instance in ladder-of-investment-based remedies. The ultimate 
purpose is to ensure free entry and to address “competition imperfections” (informational 
asymmetries, difficulties in reaching a proper market scale immediately, asset specificities, etc.) 
and not to distribute rents to new entrants. Such a mechanism should remain the equivalent of 
an “educational regulation” for infant liberalized markets, to echo Friedrich List’s argument 
regarding trade policies. 
Competition-law enforcement and sector-specific regulation are not alternative but rather 
complementary tools to supervise markets. Sector-specific, asymmetric provisions should be 
analyzed and “competition imperfection” considered in order to avoid facing a “competition 
failure”. 
These approaches may be necessary to unblock and accelerate the liberalization process. 
However, they fundamentally suppose an asymmetric treatment of market players and they 
require supervision of cross-subsidisations between them. The risk that new entrants could 
benefit from collectively unproductive windfall profits cannot be excluded. Therefore, the 
sector-specific regulator should fine-tune its interventions to maintain proper incentives for the 
market players to invest. In the case of the ladder of investment approach, the result depends 
on the regulator’s capacity to extract information and to credibly commit to progressively 
removing the different rungs of the ladder, whatever the consequences on the market structure. 
This approach leads to even more difficulties than the ones that would result from an EFD 
implementation. As Ridyard (2004) stated, “such regulation should be confined to cases where 
there has been an extreme and chronic breakdown of the competitive process”. 
The example of the railway liberalization shows that competition-law-based remedies cannot 
be sufficient to guarantee a real market contestability because of the high level of barriers to 
entry and exit. These barriers can only be removed by extending the notion of essential 
facilities. Furthermore, these competition-based decisions cannot be infringements because 
                                                        
46 See for instance, the opening to competition of the British market with an asymmetric regulation between 
BT and Mercury, or the mobile termination call costs regulation case. 
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they risk being overturned by the General Court or the Court of Justice. The reluctance of courts 
to endorse the EFD demonstrates this. Therefore, remedies based on competition law are 
normally commitment decisions, with all the limits associated with these settlements. As 
competition-law enforcement provides only an imperfect tool to apply these quasi-regulatory 
remedies, an implementation of these remedies by a sector-specific regulator appears to us a 
better way to achieve this goal.  
An asymmetric regulation that enables new entrants to access quasi-essential facilities might 
provide a good signal to them and reduce the risk of unethical strategies by incumbents by 
relying on the competencies of regulators. The last question could be related to the link between 
the ex-ante regulation and the ex-post enforcement of competition law: should they be 
complimentary or should a system like the one implemented in the UK be preferred, where the 
sector-specific regulator is also in charge of the enforcement of competition law in its field? 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1. Number of EU railway operators by countries in 2016-2017 
Country Number of 
railways 
undertakings 
Number of 
railways 
undertakings 
 
2016 2017 
Austria 40 42 
Belgium 14 15 
Bulgaria 14 15 
Croatia 8 8 
Czech Republic 96 99 
Denmark 14 14 
Estonia 17 17 
Finland 2 2 
France 22 25 
Germany 340 319 
Greece 2 2 
Hungary 28 28 
Italy 32 34 
Kosovo 2 3 
Latvia 5 5 
Lithuania 1 1 
Luxembourg 2 2 
Republic of North 
Macedonia 
1 1 
Netherlands 39 47 
Norway 11 11 
Poland 82 86 
Portugal 4 4 
Romania 26 28 
Slovakia 37 43 
Slovenia 6 5 
Spain 10 11 
Sweden 21 20 
Switzerland 54 61 
United Kingdom 36 35 
Source: IRG-Rail’s report (April 2019) 
 
